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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS  
Towards a Greater Understanding of the Antecedents of Dehumanization:  
A Contempt-Dehumanization Framework  
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Fade Rimon Eadeh 
 
 Master of Arts in Psychology  
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013  
Professor Alan Lambert, Chair 
 
 Although dehumanization has been studied in a variety of conceptual and methodological 
paradigms, surprisingly little is known about the role of affect as a mediator of the 
dehumanization process.  In this paper we propose and test a contempt-dehumanization model, 
which stipulates that, the effect of severe norm violations on dehumanization is indirect, as 
mediated by contempt (norm violation !  contempt !  dehumanization).  Across three studies 
we provide consistent support for this model in the realm of extremely immoral acts committed 
by drug dealers who intentionally target young children (Experiments 1 and 3) as well as 
unscrupulous Wall Street businessmen who deliberately scam unsuspecting elderly investors 
(Experiment 2).  We discuss the implications of our model for previous models of 
dehumanization.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The process of dehumanization—denying a person or group its critical essence of 
humanity—has been associated with some of the most tragic and truly horrific events in history.    
For example, many acts of attempted genocide, such as those committed by Nazis against Jews, 
were predicated on the premise that the targeted group was, literally, less than human. As David 
Livingstone Smith noted in a recent interview on National Public Radio, “When the Nazis 
described Jews as Untermenschen, or subhuman, they didn't mean it metaphorically…they didn't 
mean they were like subhumans. They meant they were literally subhuman.” ('Less Than 
Human': The Psychology Of Cruelty, 2011). 
 As a number of scholars have noted, however, the process of dehumanization can also 
emerge in relatively subtle ways (Leyens et al., 2000; Leyens, et al., 2003; Tam et al., 2007; 
Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006).  For example, take cases in 
which people seem to ignore a homeless person who is asking for help on the sidewalk.  As 
Darley & Latane (1968) show via the bystander intervention, there are many reasons that we 
might not render help, including (a) failure to even notice him or her in the first place, or (b) the 
perception that their plight does not constitute a true emergency. However, the decision to not 
render assistance might, in some cases, be driven by a tendency to objectify that person, in the 
sense that we treat him or her more as a “thing”, than a person.  This does not mean that people 
literally think of homeless people as subhuman.  However, this represents an instance in which 
we begin to see the person as somewhat-less-than-human, even if we do not literally conclude 
that they belong to a different species. (For related discussions, see Haslam, 2006.) 
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  ON THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN THE DEHUMANIZATION PROCESS 
 One of the key features of dehumanization is a presumed lack of secondary “human” 
emotions in the group or person that is being dehumanized (Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & 
Suitner, 2008; see also Leyens et al., 2000).  In other words, one important component of the 
dehumanization process—denial of full humanity—may manifest itself in terms of inference that 
“they do not feel the same emotions we feel.”  As a number of scholars have noted, these sorts of 
inferences may make it easier to inflict harm on the targeted group (Cuddy et al., 2007).  For 
example, just as people might attempt to legitimize the killing of certain creatures (e.g., insects) 
on the grounds that such creatures do not experience the same kinds of feelings as experienced 
by humans, a similar justification seems to underlie historical examples of horrific violence 
against other people on the grounds that they, too, do not experience the same kinds of feelings 
as do other human beings.  Hence, affect clearly plays an important role in these models as an 
important consequence of dehumanization: the inference that certain people do not feel emotions 
in the same way as the rest of humanity.   
On the Role of Affect as a Mediator of Dehumanization  
 Affect could play a different role in the dehumanization process, potentially as a 
mediator.  In this case, the focus is not on the kinds of inferences that people make about the 
person or group that is being dehumanized (see above).  Rather, the issue at hand is whether 
affect as experienced by the perceiver is driving the dehumanization process.  To anticipate the 
discussion to follow, surprisingly little research has directly examined the formal role of affect as 
a mediator, and one of the central goals of the present research was to gain more insight into 
these matters.  Unless noted otherwise, our use of the term “affect” along with related terms such 
as “emotions” or “feelings” are referring the experiential state of the perceiver—the party 
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engaged in the dehumanization process—as opposed to the inferred presence or absence of affect 
in the targeted group. 
 It is important to acknowledge at the outset that most (although not all) theorists have 
indirectly or directly implicated dehumanization as an important precursor to violence and 
aggression, especially towards outgroups.  Moreover, as Haslam (2006) notes, dehumanization 
often involves extremely negative appraisals of others.  Hence, we are certainly not the first to 
suggest that dehumanization is likely to involve negative feelings towards the targeted group (see 
also Bar Tal, 2000).  Nevertheless, a number of important issues remain unresolved.  For one 
thing, we are not aware of any formal, empirically based attempts to actually test mediational 
models of affect in a dehumanization paradigm.  As a related point, it is quite unclear what kind 
of affect, exactly, would play this kind of mediational role.  Of course, the affect would 
presumably be negative in tone.  However, different types of emotions are associated with 
different types of goals and behavioral outcomes, even when they share the same valence 
(Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Lambert et al., 2010; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Schwarz, 
1990).  For this reason, it is important to understand what kind of negative emotion would play a 
role in mediating the emergence of dehumanization.   
CLOSER CONSIDERATION OF THE HARRIS AND FISKE (2006) MODEL 
 A recent model proposed by Harris and Fiske (2006) merits additional attention, for at 
least two reasons.  First, more than most other dehumanization models, their model explicitly 
emphasizes the negative feelings that people may feel when they are dehumanizing others.  This 
is clearly an important point and this underlying assumption is clearly important in our research 
as well.  However, it is one thing to argue that negative affect accompanies the process of 
dehumanization but it is quite another thing to show that such feelings actually mediate the 
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process of dehumanization. Harris and Fiske (2006) clearly make a solid case for the former, but 
do not present any data that bear on the latter.  
 In addition to not testing/considering the formal role of mediation, their model is 
somewhat unclear as to what kind of negative emotion, exactly, would be central to the 
dehumanization process in the first place.  In the introduction of their paper, Harris and Fiske 
(2006) make a passing reference to the possibility that contempt (which reflects a blend of anger 
and disgust; see Plutchik, 1980; 2001) may be central to the dehumanization process, but their 
empirical focus is almost exclusively on disgust.  In our view, we believe that disgust is indeed 
central to the dehumanization process.  Nevertheless, we believe that anger is critical as well.   In 
other words, dehumanization is likely to be driven not only by disgust, and not only by anger: it 
is likely to involve both emotions. 
 Identifying disgust and anger as key, dual components of dehumanization is more 
important than it might seem at first.  This is because these two types of emotion, although 
clearly correlated with one another, are clearly distinct and highlight two important aspects of the 
dehumanization process.  On the one hand, disgust clearly seems to capture the “debasement” 
element of dehumanization, that is, that part of our perceptions that leads us to be repelled by 
others.  However, the feeling of disgust, alone, may not be sufficient (in a logical as well as 
psychological sense) to propel people to commit and/or endorse violence and aggression.  That is 
the job of anger.  In other words, in order to more deeply understand the true nature of 
dehumanization and its potential consequences, it is important to acknowledge the role of anger 
and disgust. 
 In suggesting that anger and disgust are both important in the context of dehumanization, 
it is important to be more precise what this means on an analytic level.  In particular, we assume 
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that (a) anger and disgust are likely to be moderately-to-strongly correlated with another, that (b) 
each of these two types of emotions, taken in isolation, could act as mediators of the 
dehumanization process, (c) statistically controlling for disgust should eliminate the mediating 
role of anger, and (d) statistically controlling for anger should eliminate the mediating role of 
disgust and, finally, (e) other negative emotions, such as anxiety, should play no mediating role 
at all.  
 To summarize, we see the blend of anger and disgust as central to the dehumanization 
process and, to our knowledge, we are the first to formally test whether these emotions play a 
central role in the dehumanization process.  As such, our primary analyses involved a composite 
measure of negative affect that was based on an average of several items pertaining to anger 
along with several items pertaining to disgust.  In theory, we could have referred to this 
composite as the “anger/disgust” index but, in accordance with Plutchik’s theoretical model  
(which explicitly defines contempt as a blending of anger and disgust) we use the contempt term 
here as well.  In the auxiliary section of our results section, we report separate analyses on anger 
and disgust.  As noted above, however, the effects of anger disappeared when disgust was 
controlled for and vice versa, indicating that both components are central to the dehumanization 
process.  
Are Inferences of (Low) Warmth and (Low) Competence Central to  
the Dehumanization Process? 
 One additional point of comparison with the Harris and Fiske (2006) model is worth 
noting.  According to the Harris and Fiske (2006) formulation, two important preconditions must 
be satisfied in order for dehumanization to take place: those being dehumanized must be seen as 
(a) lacking in warmth and (b) low in competence. This is an extremely important premise of the 
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Harris and Fiske (2006) model because it stipulates rather stringent boundary conditions for 
when dehumanization should, and should not, occur.   
 In our view, the stipulation that dehumanization can only occur when groups (or 
individuals) are seen as low in warmth and low in competence is too restrictive. This seemed 
especially likely in the case of competence. In our view, certain kinds of morally offensive acts 
can trigger dehumanization, even though its members might be seen as rather competent. For 
example, Americans often tended to see their opponents in World War II (i.e. Nazis and 
Japanese) in dehumanizing terms, despite the fact that these groups were waging war on the 
same level of technological sophistication as American troops. Consistent with this point, we 
provide support for our model in the context of severe moral violations committed by a rather 
competent group (i.e. Wall Street investors).  As for warmth, we agree that perceptions of low 
warmth (e.g. perceptions that the other group is “cold” and/or is lacking in likeability) can often 
accompany the process of dehumanization.  As we shall show, however, neither warmth nor 
competence played a central role in mediating the process of dehumanization per se.  
SUMMARY OF OUR CONTEMPT-DEHUMANIZATION FRAMEWORK 
 In this article, we introduce a new model of dehumanization and present three 
experiments that were designed to test key aspects of that theoretical model.  Our model 
generally builds upon existing theoretical and empirical work related to dehumanization (Bar-
Tal, 1989; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005; 
Leyens et al., 2001).  However, our model is distinct in other ways, and offers several novel, and 
empirically testable, predictions not offered by previous models.  
 According to our framework, as summarized in Figure 1, violations of moral conduct 
(defined broadly) plays an indirect, rather than direct, role in triggering dehumanization. In 
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particular, such violations are presumed to trigger feelings of contempt and these feelings are 
postulated, in turn, to lead to dehumanization.  Hence, although moral violations are certainly 
important in the context of our model, contempt is hypothesized to play the most proximal, 
causal role in driving dehumanization.  As a related point, our model explicitly acknowledges 
that dehumanization may certainly be associated with several different kinds of negative 
psychological reactions, other than contempt per se.  For example, violations of moral codes are 
very likely to trigger a wide range of negative psychological reactions, including the activation 
of generally negative attitudes, assessed as lacking warmth, along with certain types of negative 
personality attributions. In the context of our model, however, it is the activation of contempt, 
and not these other elements, that are presumed to trigger dehumanization.   
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
 In each of the three experiments presented below, we experimentally manipulated the 
severity of the moral violation by randomly assigning half of our participants to a severe moral 
violation and the other half to a moderate moral violation. In two of our studies (Experiments 1 
and 3), the experimental manipulation involved varying the severity of the crimes committed by 
drug dealers, insofar as they were described either as targeting young children (severe violation) 
or young professionals (moderate violation).  In the other study (Experiment 2), the manipulation 
of moral code violation pertained to whether financial investors were described as deliberately 
cheating elderly pensioners (severe violation) or affluent couples (moderate violation).  In all 
three studies, we predicted, and found, that (a) priming a severe (vs. moderate) moral violation 
would be more likely to trigger the activation of contempt, and (b) activation of these feelings of 
contempt would, in turn, lead to increased evidence of dehumanization processes. In addition, 
Experiment 3 was designed to provide evidence for the downstream consequences of 
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dehumanization, namely, how the activation of these processes can have important ramifications 
for behavior and attitude towards the members of the targeted group (e.g. increased support for 
use of the death penalty towards the relevant violators).  
ON OUR OPERATIONALIZATION OF DEHUMANIZATION  
 The Oxford English dictionary (2012) defines dehumanization, simply, as the process by 
which one deprives a person or group of “positive human qualities”, a view which is generally 
consistent with the way that previous researchers have defined this term.  Note, however, that use 
of Likert-type statements to assess the possible presence of dehumanization (e.g. To what extent 
do you think of the member of group X as animalistic?) runs the risk of a demand effect, in the 
sense that the use of dehumanizing language in the question, itself, might prompt participants to 
see the target group in a dehumanizing way, even though they might not have otherwise done so.   
 For this reason, we were particularly interested in the spontaneous emergence of 
dehumanization, that is, obtaining evidence of dehumanization that would emerge from our 
participants, in the absence of any explicit or implicit prompts by us. To this end, our primary 
measure of dehumanization was based on a paradigm in which participants were (a) first asked to 
read about a target group and then (b) asked to complete a “word generation” exercise, in which 
participants generate ten words that they think best described the target group.  We then coded 
responses in terms of whether the words generated did, or did not, represent examples of 
dehumanizing language using a general definition of dehumanization that was consistent with the 
conceptualization offered in the literature.  That is, any given word was coded as dehumanizing 
if it clearly seemed to imply the absence of positive human qualities.  
 When we began coding the words generated by participants, we quickly realized that the 
construct of dehumanization is a fuzzy set (Zadeh, 1965).  That is, like most other categories (cf. 
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Smith & Medin, 1981), dehumanization is a not classically defined category with concrete 
boundaries clearly delineating between what lies within vs. outside that category.  This means, 
on the one hand, that we were readily able to identify very clear examples of the construct (e.g. 
vermin, garbage, trash, scum).  These are clear examples of dehumanization because these are 
(a) words that clearly refer to non-human entities (i.e. inanimate objects, or non-human species) 
that (b) clearly implies that the group/person lacks positive human qualities (or, indeed, a sense 
of humanness at all).  
 However, we also came across other examples for which reasonable people could 
disagree as to whether they truly represented examples of dehumanizing language or not.  For 
example, consider the word immoral.  This term may not necessarily fit the strict sense of 
dehumanizing language because the phrase “immoral person” does not literally mean that the 
individual does not have any morals at all, but rather, has a set of beliefs that are inconsistent 
with what we would normally consider to be fair and just.  It is important to emphasize that the 
inability to make a clear delineation between words that are and are not dehumanizing does not 
imply that the category somehow lacks meaning.  For example, the construct of game does not 
have clear boundaries, even though this concept is clearly meaningful to most people (cf. Zadeh, 
1965). In the same sense, these considerations do not imply that the dehumanization concept 
lacks meaning or that it cannot be studied in a rigorous way.  Rather, it simply means that any 
given coding system would need to acknowledge the inherent fuzziness of the underlying 
construct.   
Overview of Our Analytic Strategy 
 In light of these considerations, therefore, it seemed best to use an analytic strategy that 
explicitly acknowledged the somewhat arbitrary “outer boundaries” of the dehumanization 
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construct.  In each of the experiments to follow, therefore, we coded the word generation task 
twice, using two different sets of criteria.  In one coding system, we used what we refer to as the 
“strict criterion,” coding words as examples of dehumanization only if it was very clear to all 
three co-authors that these descriptors met the strict sense of dehumanization.  On the left side of 
Appendix A, we list all words that were generated at least once in the context of the three 
experiments, and which we considered to meet this criterion1.   
 We then went though the data again using what we call the “broad criterion,” 
categorizing words as “dehumanizing” if they seemed to capture some essence of 
dehumanization, albeit in a general sense. (More precisely, words were designated as belonging 
to the broad classification scheme if they engendered some degree of debate amongst at least one 
of the co-authors). On the right side of Appendix A, we list words that were generated at least 
once in the context of our three experiments and which we classified as belonging to the 
dehumanizing category, under the broad criterion.  (Of course, the broad criterion included the 
words that were classified as examples of dehumanization using the strict criterion.)  
 As it turns out, we found a very similar pattern of results, regardless of whether we used 
the strict or broad criterion.  In our view, this represents a notable strength of our research 
paradigm, insofar as this suggests that our findings are not an artifact of any single, and possibly 
idiosyncratic, coding system.  In order to show the generalizability of our findings across these 
two operationalizations of our central construct, therefore, we report two sets of analyses, one 
using the strict criterion, and the other using the broad criterion. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 The goal of the first experiment was to provide an initial test of our contempt-
dehumanization framework.  To this end, we randomly assigned participants to one of two 
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conditions, one of which exposed them to an extreme moral violation, and one of which did not. 
In the extreme moral violation condition, participants read about a group of drug dealers who, in 
order to increase their profits, had begun to target unsuspecting young children by packaging 
dangerous drugs in the form of candy and cartoon characters.  In other words, these dealers were 
not just selling illegal drugs to adults who wanted to get high, they were intentionally getting 
children “hooked” on drugs by enticing them to buy what appeared to be merely candy.   In 
accordance with our model, we predicted, and found, that this sort of behavior triggered strong 
feelings of contempt as well as the spontaneous emergence of dehumanizing language when 
participants were asked to describe the group.  
 As in most types of designs, our study needed a control group to serve as a basis of 
comparison to the experimental condition.  In our case, however, our design was constrained by 
two considerations. First, recall that a primary dependent variable in our research was the “word 
generation” task, which allowed us to code for the spontaneous emergence of dehumanizing 
language in the context of an extreme moral violation.  Hence, it was necessary for the control 
group, to engage in an analogous task such that they, too, would be asked to spontaneously 
generate words that they considered to be a descriptive of a particular target group.   
 A second consideration is that it was important to show that the dehumanizing process 
would begin to emerge in the presence of truly extreme moral violations, and not simply 
dislikeable behavior.  For this reason, and to maximize our basis of comparison with the 
experimental condition, participants in the control group were asked to read a very similar story 
about drug dealers, except that the story was slightly altered such that the dealers were described 
as targeting young adults with so-called “designer drugs.”   
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 Hence, although the two versions of the description were very similar (and both described 
a generally dislikeable group), one version contained an extreme moral violation and the other 
did not.   It should be acknowledged, however, that there was some degree of moral violation 
even in the control condition, as the drug dealers in that condition were also engaged in illegal 
activity.   Hence, for the sake of simplicity, and in recognition that moral violations were present 
in both cases, we refer to the experimental and control group with the labels extreme violation 
vs. moderate violation, respectively. 
Method 
Participants  
 
 A total of 106 American participants (48 Male, 54 Female, gender was not reported for 
four participants) were drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk to participate in a study on social 
and political attitudes. Participants were compensated 30 cents for participation2.   
Materials and Procedure 
 
 Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two versions of a 300-word 
newspaper article about drug trafficking geared toward certain target populations. This 
newspaper article involved the illegal shipment of drugs from both Canada and Mexico and how 
these drugs were targeted to particular segments of the population. The newspaper article also 
spoke of the proliferation of these drugs around the United States, provided expert opinion on the 
matter, and presented a dire view of the state of the drug war in the United States. The primary 
difference concerned the groups (i.e., children or young adults) the drug dealers targeted.  
 Participants in the moderate moral violation condition read a story where drug dealers 
targeted young professionals across the United States, with the dealers marketing their product 
towards young professionals, with marijuana-infused organic food and ecstasy pills shaped like 
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Hollywood celebrities. Participants in the extreme moral violation condition read a story where 
the target group was young children, with the product being the pills resembling cartoon 
characters, like Dora the Explorer.  Participants were given unlimited time to read the assigned 
article.  As seen in Appendix B (which provides the full description of each version of the 
article), the two passages were very similar, differing only in the group that was being targeted 
by the drug dealers (young professionals vs. children).  
Word Generation Task 
 After reading the assigned article, all participants completed a word generation task, in 
which they were asked to generate ten words to describe the drug dealers from the story. The 
primary purpose of this task was to code for the spontaneous generation of dehumanizing terms 
(see below for coding procedure).  Participants were specifically asked, “If you have ten words 
to describe the drug dealers you had just read about, what ten words come to mind?” 
Participants were given unlimited time to come up with these ten words and inputted these words 
into ten blank boxes on the survey page under the prompt above.  
Coding of Word Generation Task 
 As one might imagine given the kind of target group under consideration here, the 
majority of participants’ descriptors were negative.  Indeed, on the average, the proportion of 
negative (as opposed to positive) words, out of the ten generated by each participant, was 75 % 
In this midst of this (obvious) negativity, however, our primary interest was in the spontaneous 
emergence of dehumanizing language.  As we noted earlier, we coded for dehumanizing words 
using a strict as well as broad, criterion (see Appendix A).  More concretely, we constructed, for 
each participant, a value on the strict criterion index, which represented the proportion of words 
(out of 10) that were deemed to represent clear-cut cases of dehumanizing language.  For 
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example, if one of our participants had a value of .20 on the strict criterion index, this meant that 
two of the words generated by that participant met the strict criterion of dehumanization.  
 We then went through the results of the word generation task again, constructing a looser 
index of dehumanization, which now allowed for a word to be coded as dehumanizing, using a 
broader criterion (see right side of Appendix A).  (We operationalized words as belonging to the 
broad criterion if these engendered disagreement among one or more of the co-authors as to 
whether the term “really’ represented dehumanization or not.)  For example, if one of our 
participants had a value of .30 on the broad criterion index, this meant that three of their words 
appeared either on the strict or the broad criterion.  
 Assessment of Emotion 
 Immediately after the word generation task, all participants were asked to “consider what 
sorts of feelings you might be feeling right now, after having read the article.”  Participants then 
completed a series of 44 items, presented in a different randomized order for each participant: 
interested, bored, edgy, happy, alert, irritated, satisfied, mad, upset, tense, sad, pleased, relaxed, 
unhappy, angry, determined, irate, dejected, anxious, comfortable, jittery, nervous, worried, 
confident, calm, disgusted, furious, outraged, infuriated, offended, riled up, incensed, fuming, 
uneasy, fearful, distressed, terrified, startled, repulsed, hostile, revulsion, hateful, scornful, and 
disdain. For each item, participants were asked to select any number between 1 (not at all) and 6 
(very much so) that best represented how they felt toward the drug dealers in the story.  On a 
priori grounds, our primary interest was in forming a composite measure of contempt, which was 
based on the average of angry, furious, outraged, disgusted, and repulsed, (alpha = .96).  
However, given the threatening nature of the group in question, we also formed an index of 
anxiety on the basis of an average of nervous, anxious, fearful, and terrified,  (alpha =  .92).  
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Trait Ratings 
 After completing the emotion measure detailed above, participants were asked to rate the 
target group with respect to a randomized series of trait terms, including warm, cold, likeable, 
friendly, sincere, pleasant, unpleasant, skilled, unskilled, competent, and incompetent. For each 
of these terms, participants were asked to select any number between 0 (not at all) and 100 (very 
much so). Although these trait ratings were generally expected to be informative, we were 
particularly interested in using these ratings in order to form composite measures of warmth and 
competence, two constructs that play a central role in the Harris and Fiske (2006) formulation.   
Hence, we formed a seven-item composite measure of warmth based on an average of warm, 
cold, likeable, friendly, sincere, pleasant, unpleasant, after reverse coding the negative items 
(alpha = .88).   We also formed a four-item measure of competence (skilled, unskilled, 
competent, and incompetent), again after reverse coding as needed (alpha = .90). 
Results 
Affective Responses  
 One of the major predictions of our model is that the moral violation manipulation should 
have a strong effect on contempt, with significantly higher levels of this emotion if the level of 
moral violation was extremely high than if it was not.   This was in fact the case, as contempt 
was significantly higher in the extreme compared to the moderate moral violation condition (Ms 
= 4.51 vs. 3.16), F (1, 104) = 18.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .15.  Participants in the severe condition also 
expressed higher levels of anxiety in the severe compared to the moderate condition (Ms = 2.85 
vs. 2.12), F (1, 104) = 7.32, p = .008, ηp2 = .07.  Hence, compared to participants assigned to the 
moderate moral violation condition, participants felt higher levels of contempt, as well as 
anxiety. As seen by the differences in effect size, however, the magnitude of the contempt effect 
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was substantially larger than that seen with anxiety, as we show ahead, the effects of anxiety 
disappeared once contempt was controlled for.  
Spontaneous Emergence of Dehumanizing Language 
As noted above, our participants almost always described the target group in negative 
ways.  However, our interest here was in the extent to which we would see the spontaneous (i.e. 
unprompted) emergence of dehumanizing language as a function of experimental condition. As 
predicted, dehumanizing language was more likely to emerge spontaneously from our 
participants if the moral violation was extreme than if it was moderate. Moreover, this was true 
regardless of whether we used the “strict” or “broad” criterion when constructing our 
dehumanization index.  Using the broad criterion, participants in the severe condition generated a 
greater proportion of dehumanizing words (M = .20) compared to participants in the moderate 
violation condition (M = .12), F (1, 104) = 9.26, p < .01, ηp2 = .08.  A similar pattern was found 
using the strict criterion (Ms = .08 vs. 04), F (1, 104) = 4.19, p < .05, ηp2 = .04.  
Perceptions of Warmth and Competence by Condition 
Participants in the severe violation condition inferred that the drug dealers were less 
warm than those participants randomly assigned to the moderate condition (Ms = 19.86 vs. 
30.76), F (1, 100) = 9.14, p < .01, ηp2 = .08.  Furthermore, participants in the severe condition 
rated the drug dealers as less competent, in comparison to those participants from the moderate 
condition (M = 57.47 vs. 74.99), F (1,104) = 15.61, p <.001, ηp2 = .13.   
Correlational analyses  
Before we present our formal mediational analyses, it is useful to present an initial set of 
analyses showing the relation among and between our main variables.  We do so in Table 1.   
The first row of this table, which conveys the point biserial correlation between the experimental 
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condition and the other variables, simply confirms the implications of the AVOVAs, reported 
above.  Of greater interest, this table also shows that the strongest predictor of dehumanization 
(regardless of whether the strict or broad criterion was used) was contempt (rs = .46 and .49, 
respectively, both ps < .001) and that the magnitude of this relation was substantially greater than 
any of the other potential predictors, including the experimental manipulation, anxiety, warmth, 
or competence. The central role of contempt was more formally confirmed in the mediational 
analyses, presented below.  
Mediational Analysis 
The results of the correlational matrix presented in Table 1 suggest the possibility of 
mediation.  We predicted that contempt would play the major mediational role, with the other 
variables playing much less (or even no) role once contempt was controlled for.   These 
considerations were tested more formally using the PROCESS macro as proposed by Hayes 
(2012).  In our analyses, (a) condition was treated as the independent variable, (b) contempt, 
warmth, and competence were treated as the three potential mediating variables with (c) the 
dehumanization index treated as the dependent measure.3  
Initial analyses revealed no significant effects of anxiety after controlling for contempt.  
Indeed, although the overall pattern of our results were almost identical regardless of whether 
anxiety was included or not in the model, the effects observed with contempt were, if anything, 
slightly stronger after controlling for anxiety.  Hence, in the analyses to be reported below, we 
controlled for feelings of anxiety.  However, because of the theoretical importance of warmth 
and competence to the Harris and Fiske (2006) framework these two factors, along with 
contempt, were included in the main analyses.  
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We conducted this analysis twice, once using the broad criterion, and again using the 
strict criterion.  In both cases, these analyses revealed a significant mediation effect involving 
contempt.  Hence, for the sake of avoiding redundancy, we present the results of our analyses for 
the broad criterion only.  The result of this analysis is shown in Figure 2.  As suggested by this 
figure, contempt emerged as a significant mediator of the relationship between the experimental 
manipulation and dehumanization, b = .35, SE = .14, p < .05 (bias corrected interval: .12--.68).  
In contrast, although attributions of warmth and competence were clearly affected by the 
experimental manipulation, these latter two factors did not play any role in terms of actually 
mediating the emergence of dehumanization.  
Supplemental Analysis  
In our model, we conceptualized and measured contempt as a meaningful emotion in its 
own right, involving a blending of anger and disgust.  Although this approach is fully consistent 
with the way that other theorists have conceptualized this emotion, it does raise the question of 
whether our effects were mostly due to the effects of anger or mostly due to disgust. 
Supplemental analyses using separate indices of anger (based on an average of angry, furious, 
and outraged) revealed, on the one hand, a general pattern of mediation that was similar than the 
results of the analyses as shown in Figure 2, b = .42, SE = .16, p < .05 (bias corrected interval: 
.15--.79).  However, any effects involving anger disappeared once disgust was controlled for, b = 
.06, SE = .07, p > .05 (bias corrected interval: -0.02—0.27).  In addition, the reverse was also 
true. Taken on its own, a separate index of disgust (based on the average of repulsed and 
disgusted) revealed a general pattern of mediation similar to that of our primary analyses, b = 
.37, SE = .14, p < .05 (bias corrected interval: .13--.70). However, the effects of disgust 
disappeared once anger was controlled for. b = .01, SE = .03, p > .05 (bias corrected interval: -
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0.03--0.14). We also substituted the strict dehumanization index instead of the broad index, to 
confirm that our effects were consistent, regardless of the dehumanization index used. Our 
additional analyses indicated the same patterns mentioned above. In separate analyses, the 
indirect effects of anger and disgust were statistically significant (p < .05). However, after 
controlling for the other emotion, these indirect effects disappeared (p > .05).  
We performed the same analytic approach over the next two experiments to see if anger 
or, alternatively, disgust, were driving our effects. Similar to the supplementary analyses 
highlighted above, each emotion on its own was able to produce a general pattern of mediation 
for both of our dehumanization indices. However, these patterns disappeared after statistically 
controlling for the other emotional index.  
Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 1 consistently supported our contempt-dehumanization 
framework in a number of ways.   First, and perhaps most important, we showed that contempt 
emerged as a strong mediator, insofar as the impact of the moral violation manipulation was 
indirect.  In other words, this manipulation did not have a direct effect on dehumanization; 
rather, this was channeled through the affective experience of contempt. Moreover, after 
controlling for contempt, inferences of low warmth, and low levels of competence, played no 
significant role in driving dehumanization.  
 It is important to emphasize that our operationalization of dehumanization focused on the 
spontaneous emergence of dehumanizing language.  That is, we allowed participants free reign 
to describe the target group in any way they wished, and we examined the extent to which 
participants generated, without any prompting by us, examples of dehumanizing language. In 
other words, aside from the fact that participants almost always generated negative descriptors in 
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the word generation task, we were interested in the extent to which truly dehumanizing language 
began to creep into their descriptions.  
 As the observant reader may have already noted, the average proportion of dehumanizing 
language was relatively low.  In our view, this represents a telling feature of dehumanization.  In 
particular, even in the context of an anonymous survey, our participants seemed to be telling us, 
in essence, that truly dehumanizing language goes well beyond mere negativity.  It is true, of 
course, that dehumanizing language is negative and, as we have noted, there may not be a strict 
boundary between what is dehumanizing and what is not.  At the same time, our data show that 
people do not use such terms lightly, as they seem to reserve these terms for the most egregious 
violations of moral standards. In our view, this highlights an important feature of dehumanizing 
language, the fact that it appears to be reserved for the most truly horrific actions of others, and 
even then people seem to use such terms sparingly. This, in our view, highlights the possibly 
unique power and “punch” of dehumanizing language. People do not often use such terms, but 
when they do, it serves as a marker of truly unacceptable actions of others.  
 In the context of our model, the central mediator of contempt represents a blending of 
anger and disgust.  Our operationalization of contempt is similar to that of previous theorists 
(Plutchik, 1980) but it does raise the possibility that the mediational effect of contempt was 
actually due to the activation of disgust, rather than anger.  Or, one could also make the argument 
that our results reflected the role of anger, as opposed to disgust.  As noted in our supplemental 
analyses, however, neither of these alternatives was supported.  Our supplemental analyses found 
separate (albeit weaker) indirect effects for analyses that included either anger or disgust related 
items into our multiple mediation model (These models included the same composite measures 
of warmth and competence, as discussed previously.)  However, upon controlling for the other 
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emotion (e.g., including anger as a mediator and controlling for disgust), neither emotional 
measure was found to statistically influence the utilization of dehumanizing language, all p’s > 
.25.   
EXPERIMENT 2 
 The overall goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate and extend the findings obtained in 
Experiment 1 with a completely different target group.  In particular, although we again 
manipulated the severity of the moral violation, this was done in the context of unscrupulous 
Wall Street investors who were, or were not, described as intentionally preying on unsuspected 
elderly people in order to bilk them out of their retirement funds.  As in the case of Experiment 
1, we tested a mediational model such that this manipulation was predicted to trigger strong 
levels of contempt and that such emotion would, in turn, be predictive of the emergence of 
dehumanizing language.  
 Our desire to focus on a different group was primarily driven by the need to show that 
our previous results were not due to some idiosyncratic property associated with drug dealers 
and, hence, an important goal of Experiment 2 was to demonstrate the generalizability of our 
theoretical model.  In focusing on Wall Street investors, we also wished to provide further 
evidence that dehumanization can be applied towards highly competent (i.e. skilled) people. In 
other words, Wall Street investors may be many things, but they are not incompetent. Indeed, it 
is the very fact that people might use their finely honed skills in order to achieve nefarious aims 
(e.g. bilking senior citizens) that can drive the emergence of dehumanization in the first place.4  
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 101 participants (47 Male, 48 Female, gender was not reported for six 
participants) from Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in our study for 50 cents.   
Experimental Manipulation.  
 Participants were randomly assigned and given unlimited time to read one of two 300-
word newspaper articles about dishonest Wall Street investors. For participants in the extreme 
moral violation condition, the target article described a group of investors who intentionally 
target senior citizens for the sake of making a profit.  Participants in the moderate moral 
violation condition were given a very similar description, except that the group being targeted   
was described as wealthy/affluent couples.  The complete description of these two versions is 
provided in Appendix C.   
Word Generation Task 
After reading the randomly assigned article presented to them, all participants completed 
the same word generation task as used in our previous experiments. Similar to our previous 
experiments, we created both the broad and strict versions of the dehumanization indices.  
Assessment of Emotion 
 Immediately after providing their open-ended response to the article, participants were 
presented with the same affective task from Experiment 1. As in our first study, we formed two 
separate emotional composites, including an index of (a) contempt (angry, furious, outraged, 
repulsed, disgusted) (alpha = .92) as well as (b) anxiety (nervous, anxious, fearful, and terrified), 
alpha =  .85).  
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Results 
Initial analyses revealed a general pattern that was similar to that of Experiment 1.  In 
particular, participants assigned to the extreme moral violation condition expressed higher levels 
of contempt compared to those assigned to the moderate moral violation condition, Ms = 4.96 vs. 
4.19), F (1, 99) = 9.66, p =.002, ηp2 = .09.  Further analyses revealed a marginal effect of 
anxiety, Ms = 2.78 vs. 2.31), F (1, 99) = 3.73, p = .06, ηp2 = .04, but this effect disappeared after 
controlling for contempt.  Finally, as in Experiment 1, we generally found more evidence of 
dehumanizing language in the extreme (vs. moderate) moral violation condition, and this was 
true regardless of whether we used the broad criterion, (Ms = .18 vs. .11), F (1, 99) = 6.08, p = 
.015, ηp2 = .06, or the strict criterion, (Ms = .09 vs. .05), F (1,99) = 5.97, p = .016, ηp2 = .06. 
Mediational Analysis 
 To examine the possibility of mediation, we again used Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS macro, 
with condition as the independent variable, contempt as the mediating variable, and our 
dependent variable as the dehumanization index. These analyses once again yielded a very 
similar pattern of results regardless of which dehumanization was used and hence in Figure 3 we 
present the results from the broad criterion only.  As seen here, our results strongly replicate and 
extend the findings obtained in Experiment 1, showing a significant mediational effect of 
contempt, b = .24, SE = .13, p < .05, bias corrected interval: .05--.59.  
Discussion  
Experiment 2 provides further evidence for our moral violation postulate, such that 
higher levels of contempt, as a result of our experimental manipulation, lead to increased 
dehumanization, regardless of whether a strict or broad criterion of dehumanization was used.  
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These results provide a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 with a different group (Wall 
Street investors), providing evidence for the stability and generalizability of our findings.   
EXPERIMENT 3 
Across the two studies reported thus far, we have provided consistent support for the 
proposed mediational process (moral violation !  contempt !  dehumanization).  Although 
we view such findings as important in their own right, their importance would be heightened still 
further if we could show that this process has other tangible ramifications, including people’s 
intentions to engage in specific behaviors.  In other words, we wished to examine the possible 
“downstream” consequences of the contempt-dehumanization process, with a particular interest 
in how these mechanisms might be relevant to people’s intentions to punish the perceived wrong 
doing.  To this end, we employed a set of procedures and materials that were generally similar to 
that of Experiment 1, except that we added a battery of behavioral intention items after our 
assessment of emotion, to assess participants’ intentions to inflict tangible punishment on the 
drug dealers in question.  These items were meant to assess a range of punitive actions toward 
the drug dealers described in the story, ranging from the number of years the moral violators 
should be imprisoned for, support for the death penalty if it were “on the table,” and whether one 
would personally engage in punishment if one saw these crimes being committed.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 125 participants (56 Male, 66 Female, gender not reported for three 
participants) from Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in our study for 50 cents.  
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Materials and Procedure 
 
 The manipulation of moral violation (moderate vs. severe) was the same as that used in 
Experiment 1. As in our earlier study, participants completed the word generation task 
immediately after reading the assigned passage.  All participants then completed the same 
affective items from the previous experiments. To assess contempt and anxiety-related emotions, 
we formed two indices, an index for contempt (angry, furious, outraged, repulsed, disgusted) 
(alpha = .95), and anxiety (nervous, anxious, fearful, worried) (alpha = .88)  
Punishment Index 
Immediately after the mood inventory, participants answered several questions indicating 
their desire to punish the drug dealers mentioned in the story. There were four questions in total. 
The first question probed participants’ intentions in terms of the length of a prison term, if they 
had the opportunity to make this determination on their own “If these drug dealers are guilty of 
crimes for which they have been charged, how long do you believe their sentence should be, in 
years?”  Immediately following this question, participants were provided with a box and were 
given the opportunity to write any number that best represented the number of years that they 
would recommend. 
The remaining three questions consisted of items to which participants were asked to 
express their relative agreement or disagreement:  One of these items pertained to a global desire 
for justice, “These drug dealers deserve to be severely punished for the harm they've done to 
society,” with a second item asking participants to simulate what sort of decision that they would 
make as a member of the jury, Suppose that you were on the jury for one of the drug dealers in 
the story, and that this person was found guilty,  “If so, and if the death penalty were an option, 
how likely is it that would you advocate for the death penalty?” The third item asked participants 
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whether they, themselves, would initiate acts of aggression towards the members of this group:  
If you saw drug dealers committing the acts mentioned in the story, to what extent would you 
personally consider committing violence towards them? For each of these three items, 
participants were asked to indicate their opinion towards the statement by selecting any number 
between 0 and 100, with higher numbers indicating greater agreement/endorsement of the item in 
question.  
 Although these four items were asking conceptually distinct questions, initial analyses 
revealed that response on all four items were highly correlated with one another (all rs > .30, ps 
< .001).   In light of this overlap, we formed an overall composite of intended punishment on the 
basis of an average of all four items. (Prior to forming this composite, we first performed a log 
transformation on the “years in prison” item to reduce positive skew, and we then converted all 
four items to z scores.)   Higher and lower numbers on this index (alpha = .81) thus indicate a 
relatively high vs. low desire for punishment, respectively. 
Results 
 Initial analyses generally revealed the same pattern observed in Experiments 1 and 2.  In 
particular, participants assigned to the extreme moral violation condition expressed higher levels 
of contempt compared to those assigned to the moderate moral violation condition, (Ms = 4.34 
vs. 3.10), F (1, 123 ) = 19.13 p < .001, ηp2 = .14  Further analyses revealed an effect of anxiety, 
(Ms =3.02 vs. 2.38), F (1, 123) = 6.62, p = .01, ηp2 = .05, but this effect disappeared after 
controlling for contempt.  We also found more evidence of dehumanizing language in the 
extreme (vs. moderate) moral violation condition, and this was true regardless of whether we 
used the broad criterion, (Ms = .20 vs. .14), F (1, 123) = 5.11, p = .03, ηp2 = .04, or the strict 
criterion, (Ms = .10 vs. .05), F (1, 123) = 3.78, p = .05, ηp2 = .03.  Additional analyses also 
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revealed greater intentions for punishment in the severe compared to the moderate moral 
violation condition, (Ms = 0.22 vs. -0.24), F (1,123) = 11.11, p = .001, ηp2 = .08. 
Mediational Analyses I: Dehumanization as Criterion 
 To show the parallelism with Experiments 1 and 2, it is useful at the outset to show 
support for our model with respect to the predicted relationships involving the experimental 
manipulation, feelings of contempt, and the two dehumanization indices.  (In these analyses, we 
temporarily omitted the punishment index from consideration.)   The results of these analyses, 
which were again generated by Hayes’ (2012) PROCESS macro, are shown in Figure 4 for the 
broad criterion of the dehumanization index.  (As in our two previous studies, a very similar 
pattern of results was obtained with the strict criterion.)  As seen in Figure 4, our findings nicely 
converge on the implications of our two earlier studies, showing a significant mediational effect 
of contempt, b = .27, SE = .12, p < .05 (bias corrected interval: .09--.62).  
Mediational Analyses II: Punishment Index as Criterion  
 In these analyses, punishment (rather than dehumanization) was now treated as the 
criterion variable.  As such, these analyses were conducted in order to determine whether 
contempt, as well as dehumanization, served to mediate the effect of the experimental 
manipulation on punishment.  The result of this analysis is displayed in Figure 5. Once again, a 
generally similar pattern of results was found regardless of whether the broad or strict criterion 
was used and hence we report the analyses for the broad criterion only.  
 Formal tests of mediation revealed two significant effects.  First, contempt served as a 
mediator in its own right, b = .19, SE = .07, p < .05, bias corrected interval: .07--.35.  Second, we 
also found evidence of serial mediation, such that contempt as well as dehumanization served to 
mediate the effect of the experimental manipulation on punishment (condition ! contempt ! 
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dehumanization ! punishment index), b = .02, SE = .02, p < .05 (bias corrected interval: .00--
.07). We conducted this analysis once again, but instead of using the broad dehumanization 
index, we instead opted for the strict dehumanization index. Analyses suggested no substantive 
differences between the effects found using the broad index or the strict index.  
 Discussion 
Experiment 3 provides further evidence of our contempt-dehumanization framework, 
such that the indirect effect of contempt was a statistically significant predictor of 
dehumanization. In addition, we were also interested in whether our experimental manipulation 
was able to systematically predict motivation to punish norm violators.  Here too, we found a 
conditional difference, such that participants randomly assigned to the severe condition had a 
greater desire to punish norm violators, in comparison to participants in the moderate condition. 
Participants in the severe condition supported longer prison sentences, increased support for the 
death penalty, and greater vigilantism against the drug dealers mentioned in the story.   
We were also interested in whether our contempt-dehumanization model was able to 
predict the propensity to punish the norm violators from the story (see Appendix B).  We found 
that both the indirect pathways for both contempt alone and contempt to dehumanization were 
statistically significant. These results suggest that there are downstream consequences to 
dehumanization, in the form of a greater willingness for punishing norm violators. Participants 
that felt greater contempt would be more likely to categorize the drug dealers as non-human. 
This categorization, in turn, led to an increased motivation to punish the nefarious drug dealers 
depicted in the story.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Previous models of dehumanization have tended to focus on affect as a consequence of 
dehumanization. That is, previous models have focused on the tendency for people to infer that 
dehumanized groups/individuals lack the capacity to feel the same kinds of emotional 
experiences as others (especially, members of the ingroup; Haslam et al., 2008; see also Leyens 
et al., 2000).   The focus of the present research was different.  In particular, we were focused on 
the role of affect as a mediator of dehumanization.  In other words, when perceivers dehumanize 
others, what kinds of affective experiences are driving the dehumanization process?   
Across three experiments, we found consistent support for the for our contempt-
dehumanization framework. According to our model, severe norm violations can trigger the 
dehumanization process, but does so indirectly, via the activation of contempt.  We provided 
support for our model across two domains of norm violations, including drug dealers that 
intentionally target young children (Experiments 1 and 3) as well as unscrupulous Wall Street 
investors that deliberately scam their elderly clients. To be sure, we are hardly the first to suggest 
that the process of dehumanization is likely to involve aversive reactions toward the targeted 
group. To our knowledge, however, we are the first to conduct formal tests of affective 
mediation.  In so doing, we provide new insight into the specific role of affect in driving the 
dehumanization process.    
Comparison of our Framework with Previous Models of Dehumanization 
 As noted earlier, we are certainly not the only researchers highlighting the role of 
emotion in dehumanization.  For example, Harris and Fiske (2006) suggest a relationship 
between moral violations and contempt/disgust, by claiming that past moral violations are likely 
to contribute to increased feelings of contempt and disgust. These repeated violations may 
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gradually shift repeated moral violators to the low-competence, low warmth quadrant of the 
stereotype content model.  As a result, the quadrant itself is typically considered central to 
dehumanization. On a related note, the authors claim that this quadrant itself is most likely to be 
associated with feelings of disgust/contempt, as several researchers utilizing the stereotype 
content model has exhibited (Harris & Fiske, 2006, 2007; Fiske et al., 2002; Cuddy, Fiske, & 
Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). This is evident in Harris and Fiske’s (2006) model, 
as stimuli from this quadrant were associated with feelings of disgust for over 60 percent of the 
cases (see Harris and Fiske, 2006 for details).    
 Although we agree that feelings of disgust/contempt are more likely to occur in this 
quadrant (in comparison to the other three quadrants), it is not the properties of the quadrant per 
se that is likely driving these effects. Rather, we believe that contempt is the most proximal 
determinant of dehumanization. In other words, the driving force behind these effects is a 
byproduct of the emotion that participants feel towards the group, and not perceptions of the 
group’s warmth and competence.   
In summary, we believe that the Harris and Fiske (2006) conceptualization of 
dehumanization as a function of low warmth and low competence is probably too restrictive. If 
perceptions of low competence and warmth were necessary for dehumanization, then it would be 
unlikely to generate dehumanizing language to social groups that fall outside of these 
boundaries.  However, our findings from Experiment Two seem to run somewhat contrary to 
Harris and Fiske’s (2006) model, since the Wall Street investors committing the moral violation 
were described in dehumanized terms just as frequently as their low competence, low warmth 
counterparts. Since this group was dehumanized just as much as the drug dealers from the first 
experiment, it stands to reason that perceptions of competence are an unlikely component in 
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dehumanization. Furthermore, our results from Experiment One suggest that warmth, too, plays 
no direct role in the dehumanization process.  
Two departures of our research vis a vis previous work should be noted. First, participants 
were asked to spontaneously generate ten words to describe the moral violators about which they 
read. The coding of spontaneous language—where participants were asked to come up with these 
words on their own—may be a significant advantage over explicit ratings of dehumanizing 
attitudes. For instance, asking participants to generate Likert-style ratings of moral violators’ 
level of humanity might induce demand effects. However, since participants did not make 
explicit ratings, and instead generated words, we were able to alleviate such concerns.  
Second, the use of a nontraditional control condition offers some benefits and, of course, 
some disadvantages.  A traditional control condition might have participants write about the 
mundane events in their life or perhaps about a different social group that does not commit a 
moral violation.  Although the use of such a condition may serve as a more effective emotional 
baseline, its use may introduce confounds. For example, participants that are asked to read about 
a different social group may engender feelings of contempt, which would likely increase the use 
of dehumanizing language.  Instead, by using the same social group and simply varying the 
severity of the moral violation, we were able to circumvent this issue.  Moreover, the use of a 
moderate violation committed by the same group of moral violators enables us to draw more 
confident conclusions about the implications of our data.  
Caveats and Directions for Future Research 
Although the work presented here provides a foundational framework for the 
dehumanization process, our findings raise some considerations for future research in this area.  
For instance, the current research focused on social groups, and not individuals.  We believe that 
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the kind of dehumanization processes revealed here can occur when people are judging a 
particular individual who is perceived to have strongly violated relevant norms.  For example, 
when a romantic partner lies about sexual infidelities, or when a business partner cons one out of 
their financial assets, we believe the stipulated dehumanization processes may also be likely to 
occur, when describing the moral violator in question.  
 Future research should also consider examining the cognitive accessibility of 
dehumanizing terms when one or more moral violations occur.  Although it is true that the 
spontaneous use of dehumanizing language is relatively infrequent, we believe that social 
desirability may explain its infrequent use.  To more directly test the cognitive accessibility of 
dehumanizing language, participants could conceivably be assigned to conditions in which they 
are more likely to experience feelings of contempt in comparison to those that are not.  Our 
belief is that those assigned to the severe violation condition will exhibit greater cognitive 
accessibility of dehumanizing terms in comparison to the control condition.  Current research in 
this area is promising, as recent work by Buckels & Trapnell (2013) find that being primed with 
disgust-related concepts led to greater accessibility of dehumanizing concepts.  Our lab plans to 
further examine this paradigm using implicit measures of dehumanization, to determine whether 
a feeling of contempt facilitates the accessibility of dehumanizing language.  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, we believe that the contempt-dehumanization framework offers major 
insight into how dehumanization occurs. Previous dehumanization research has examined the 
perceived emotional abilities of the targets of dehumanization (Leyens et al., 2001), citing that 
dehumanized targets are perceived as lacking the ability to evoke secondary emotions. However, 
in our case, we are interested in whether an emotional signature of the person carrying out the 
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dehumanization exists. The data presented in this article provides support for our postulate that 
feelings of contempt by the perceiver are at the heart of dehumanization. We hope that future 
research advances and clarifies the dehumanization framework, so that subsequent work can gain 
insight into how the process of dehumanization may drive judgment and behavior towards social 
groups as well as the people who belong to them.  
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FOOTNOTES 
 
 1 Our strict dehumanization index was positively skewed across all three studies  (all 
studies skew > 2.0).  Thus, prior to formal analyses, we reduced the skew of this index through a 
log transformation procedure (Cohen & Cohen, 1975).  In the three studies with high positive 
skew, this procedure substantially reduced skew (all studies skew < 1.0).  Thus, formal analyses 
for these three studies were conducted on the transformed indices.  However, for ease of 
interpretability, the values to be presented in the text and in Table 1 are presented in their 
original (non-transformed) values.  
 2  Experiment 1 did not reveal any gender differences for any of our analyses. Experiment 
2 contained one significant gender effect, such that female (vs. male) felt greater levels of 
anxiety.  Experiment 3 revealed only one gender effect, such that, overall female participants felt 
greater contempt than men. However, neither of these effects involved the experimental 
manipulation and hence do not qualify the implications of our conclusions.  Hence, in all of the 
analyses to follow, we collapse over gender. 
 3  We used this analytic approach over the classic mediational analysis as proposed by 
Baron and Kenny (1986) for four reasons. First, the first step of the Baron and Kenny mediation 
model requires a statistically significant relationship between our experimental condition and our 
dehumanization indices. Although this is true for almost all of the mediational analyses presented 
below, Experiment 3’s conditional effect (using the strict dehumanization index) fell outside of 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  Second, the Baron and Kenny approach does not 
allow for covariation. In particular, throughout all of the mediational analyses performed in this 
article, the emotional effects of anxiety were covaried from our analyses. Third, this approach 
does not allow for more complicated analyses, such as the multiple mediation analyses presented 
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in Experiment One and the serial mediation analyses presented in Experiment Three. Fourth, the 
Baron and Kenny (as well as the Sobel Test, 1982) assume that the product of the indirect affect 
is normally distributed. To circumvent issues of normal distribution, the statistic analysis tool 
offered by Hayes allows us to bootstrap these indirect effects. 
 4 This assumption was verified in a small pilot study (N = 15) run prior to conducting 
Experiment 2.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of two versions of our Wall Street 
newspaper article (article details are presented in Appendix C as well as the methods section to 
follow).  After reading the randomly assigned article, participants were asked how competent 
they perceived the Wall Street professionals on a scale of 0 (Not at all Competent) to 100 
(Highly Competent).  Overall, our grand mean (M = 52.67) indicated that participants saw the 
Wall Street professionals as moderately competent.  We also investigated if perceptions of the 
Wall Street professionals’ competence varied by condition.  Perceptions of competence trended 
in the same direction of Experiment One.  Participants randomly assigned to the severe condition 
rated the moral violators as less competent (M = 45.71) in comparison to the moderate condition 
(M = 58.75), although, these differences did not approach conventional levels of statistical 
significance, F (1,13) < 1.0, p = .50. 
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Strict Criterion 
 
Garbage 
Demon* 
Dirt bags 
Trash 
Scum* 
Inhumane 
Bitches 
Trash* 
Bottom Feeders 
Vampires 
Blood Suckers 
Leeches 
Animals 
Pigs 
Predators 
Snakes 
Rats 
Parasites 
Monsters 
Devils 
Jackals 
Worms 
Leeches 
Inhuman 
Not human 
Shit 
Crap 
Dirt*/Dirty 
Prey 
Subhuman
Vipers 
Lamprey 
Waste 
Cesspool 
Weasels 
Pond Scum 
Rapscallions  
Scavengers  
Douchebag 
Jackasses 
Maggots 
Shit Rooster 
Venomous 
 
 
 
 
Additional  Items included under broad criterion 
 
Heartless 
Spineless 
Soulless 
Immoral 
Careless 
Uncaring 
Ruthless 
Shameless 
Emotionless 
Low Morals 
Cold-hearted 
Conscienceless 
Black Hearted 
Unethical 
Unscrupulous 
Amoral 
Valueless 
Lack of Morals 
Unfeeling 
Jackasses 
Moral-less 
Morally bankrupt 
Slimy 
Filthy 
Base 
Worthless 
Scoundrels 
Impaired 
Degenerates 
Antisocial 
Appendix A: Dehumanization Wor d List 
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Severe 
 
 
Moderate
Kansas City - They're colorful, flavorful and they might appeal to your kids. But they're also dangerous street drugs. Without drug 
users, drug dealers would go out of business. Because there needs to be a demand for the illegal drugs they produce and traffic, dealers 
are continually looking to attract more "customers" -- to get more people "hooked on their junk."" And among drug dealers there are no 
qualms about target-marketing kids," says COMBAT Assistant Director of Operations Vince Ferris, a 30-year veteran of the Kansas 
City, Missouri Police Department.  
 
"They're trying to create the next generation of addicts -- their new customers -- by creating 'products' made to appeal specifically to 
children." Here are just three examples: Ecstasy pills shaped like cartoon characters, methamphetamine packaged like candy and 
marijuana-laced treats. “That's purposeful,” says Ferris, “It’s why they package drugs that way. They make it so it doesn't seem so 
harmful. It’s scary to see that because we're having more youth come in that are minimizing the effects drugs can have on them." But 
its use has gone up. Last year alone, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents intercepted a half-million tablets in Washington 
State, mostly at the border. 
 
The Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) began raising awareness about Ecstasy tablets shaped like Snoopy and Dora the Explorer 
in a June 2009 bulletin issued to law enforcement agencies across the nation. A month later, a U.S. Border Patrol dog discovered more 
than 46 pounds of the pills stuffed in a suitcase on a bus in Harlingen, Texas. How many pills would that have been? Consider 
this: Approximately 200 ecstasy pills, seized in another Texas arrest, tipped the scales at around 63 grams -- about one-tenth of a pound. 
Appendix B: Stimuli for  Severe (Top) and Moderate (Bottom) moral violation conditions in Exper iments One and Three 
Kansas City - They're “healthy”, flavorful and they might appeal to Young professionals. But they're also dangerous street drugs. 
Without drug users, drug dealers would go out of business. Because there needs to be a demand for the illegal drugs they produce and 
traffic, dealers are continually looking to improve product -- to get more people "hooked on their junk."" And among drug dealers 
there are no qualms about using," says COMBAT Assistant Director of Operations Vince Ferris, a 30-year veteran of the Kansas City, 
Missouri Police Department. 
 
 "They're trying to create the next generation of addicts -- their new customers -- by creating 'products' made to appeal adults with 
expendable income. Here are just two examples: Ecstasy pills shaped like celebrities and marijuana-laced health bars. “That's 
purposeful,” says Ferris, “It’s why they package drugs that way. They make it so it doesn't seem so harmful. It’s scary to see that 
because we're having more adults come in that are minimizing the effects drugs can have on them." But its use has gone up. Last year 
alone, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents intercepted a half-million tablets in Washington State, mostly at the border. 
  
The Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) began raising awareness about Ecstasy tablets shaped like Hollywood celebrities in a 
June 2009 bulletin issued to law enforcement agencies across the nation. A month later, a U.S. Border Patrol dog discovered more than 
46 pounds of the pills stuffed in a suitcase on a bus in Harlingen, Texas. How many pills would that have been? Consider 
this: Approximately 200 ecstasy pills, seized in another Texas arrest, tipped the scales at around 63 grams -- about one-tenth of a pound.  
 
 42 
 
Severe 
 
 
 
 
 
Moderate 
 
Appendix C: Stimuli for  Severe (Top) and Moderate (Bottom) moral violation conditions in Exper iment Two 
 
NEW YORK – Shady Wall Street Investors don’t have to profit from regular Americans to do real harm. In just the last two 
weeks, The Associated Press reported on at least a dozen cases in which investors were accused of stealing from wealthy 
Americans, mostly upper class families, whose net worth average in upwards of ten million dollars.   
These wealthy couples are not new to investing, but aren’t completely competent in some of the slight changes that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission has implemented since the 2008 stock market crisis. “Most of the wealthy couples are experienced 
investors, trying to gain money using investing tricks that worked years before the recession, with trust that their Wall Street 
investor partners would recognize that ” said Denise Houghman Johnston, the Arkansas State securities commissioner. The problem 
is going to get worse before it gets better, with investment knowledge needing to improve before these wealthy Americans are able 
to make some of their money back.  
It’s unfortunate to see a wealthy couple who's been fooled out of $50,000 or $60,000 or $70,000 - oftentimes their down payment 
for a summer condo or a new car," said Michael Kappas, CEO of Apprisen Financial Advocates in Columbus, Ohio. Wealthy 
couples beginning to reinvest in the stock market may face a bit of a learning curve to these new regulations, with hopes that their 
financial investors instruct them of the changes that have been made.  
NEW YORK –Shady Wall Street Investors don't have to bilk billions to do real harm. In just the last two weeks, The Associated 
Press reported on at least a dozen cases in which investors were accused of stealing, on average, just over $416 million from the 
unsuspecting elderly, people typically reliant on social security. Their alleged frauds touched retirement-aged couples in as many as 
22 states. 
Senior citizens are especially vulnerable to con artists peddling Ponzi schemes and other dead-end deals. “Most victims are older and 
many of them have cognitive impairment,” said Denise Voigt Crawford, the Texas State securities commissioner. The problem is 
going to get worse as baby boomers age, she said, adding that one new twist is many of the newest swindlers are also elderly. 
Even worse, many of these investors are well aware of this cognitive impairment and deliberately target elderly couples as a result, 
since this age bracket highlights a highly susceptible section of the American population. "There's nothing worse than seeing an 
elderly couple who's been scammed out of $50,000 or $60,000 or $70,000 - oftentimes their life savings," said Michael Kappas, 
CEO of Apprisen Financial Advocates in Columbus, Ohio. 
Seniors who live alone may be the most vulnerable - the "elderly widow" is an investor’s classic target. And the rapid migration of 
seniors online may expose this population to even more fraud. Nielsen estimates the number of Internet users age 65 and older shot 
up 55 percent in the last five years. 
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Measure (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Condition (0 = control; 1 = experimental) - .20*  .28** .28** .38*** -.28** -.36*** 
2. Dehumanization Index—Strict  - .72*** .17† .46*** -.32** -.25** 
3. Dehumanization Index—Broad   - .20* .49*** -.41*** -.24* 
4. Anxiety    - .63*** -.26** -.05 
5. Contempt     - -.50*** -.22* 
6. Warmth      - .24* 
7. Competence       - 
       
       † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01,*** p < .001.
Table 1:  Correlational Analyses (Experiment 1) 
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Figure 1: Schematic of the Contempt-Dehumanization Framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moral 
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Note: dotted arrows represent pathways that are postulated to be weak after statistically controlling for contempt. 
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Figure 2: Experiment One Multiple Mediation Analysis of the Broad Dehumanization Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Moderate vs. severe moral violation corresponds to conditions in which drug dealers young professionals vs. children, 
respectively (see text). † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Warmth 
Contempt 
Competence 
Moral Violation  
(0 = Moder ate, 1 = Severe) Dehumanization-Br oad 
Total effect (c): b = .758 (.276)** 
 
 
Direct effect (c’): b = .223 (.267)   
b = -9.08 (3.68)* 
 
b = .90 (.28)** 
 
Direct effect (c’): 
b = -17.14  (4.64)*** 
 
Direct effect (c’): b = 
b = .012 (.007) 
b = .389 (.097)*** 
 
Direct effect (c’): b = 
b = -.004 (.005)  
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Figure 3: Experiment Two Mediational Analysis of the Broad Dehumanization Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Moderate vs. severe moral violation corresponds to conditions in which Wall Street investors targeted affluent vs. elderly 
couples, respectively (see text). † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Total effect (c): b = 0.92 (0.30) **     
 
Direct effect (c`): b = 0.68 (0.29)* 
 
b =   0.58 (0.23) * 
 
b =   0.42 (0.11)** 
Moral Violation 
(0 = Moderate, 1 = Severe 
Contempt Dehumanization-Br oad 
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Figure 4: Experiment Three Mediational Analysis of the Broad Dehumanization Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: moderate vs. severe moral violation corresponds to conditions in which drug dealers targeted young professionals vs. children, 
respectively (see text). † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01,*** p < .001
Total effect (c): b = 0.73 (0.28) **     
 
Direct effect (c`): b = 0.46 (0.28) 
 
b =   0.78 (0.23) *** 
 
b =   0.35 (0.11)** 
Moral Violation 
(0 = Moderate, 1 = Severe Contempt Dehumanization-Br oad 
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Figure 5: Experiment Three Serial Mediation Analyses of Punishment Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: moderate vs. severe moral violation corresponds to conditions in which drug dealers targeted young professionals vs. children, 
respectively (see text). The absence of an explicit pathway between variable indicates no explicit relationship between the variables in 
question. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01,*** p < .001 
Total effect (c): b = 0.46 (0.14) **     
 
Direct effect (c`): b = 0.06 (0.12) 
 
b = 0.35 (0.11) ** 
 
b = 0.78 (0.23)** 
Moral Violation 
(0 = Moderate,  
1 = Severe) 
b =  0.09 (0.04) * 
 
b =   0.24 (0.05) *** 
 
Contempt Dehumanization-Br oad Punishment 
